Thinking about Basing by Harkavy, Robert E.
Naval War College Review
Volume 58




Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harkavy, Robert E. (2005) "Thinking about Basing," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/2
Dr. Harkavy is professor of political science at Pennsyl-
vania State University. He has also taught, performed
research, or served at the U.S. Army War College, Cor-
nell University, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, Kalamazoo College, and the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission. He earned his PhD in interna-
tional relations at Yale University in 1973, having pur-
sued graduate study also at the University of California
at Berkeley, the Harvard Business School, and Basel
University in Switzerland. After earning his BA at Cor-
nell, he was for eight years a junior officer in the U.S.
Army Reserve (artillery). He has written or edited sev-
eral books, most recently Warfare and the Third World
(2001) and Strategic Geography and the Changing
Middle East (1997).
The author wishes to thank Lucian Czarnecki, Penn
State undergraduate, for research assistance in connec-
tion with this project. An expanded version of this article
(with additional historical and tabular material) is to be
published by the Naval War College Press as a Newport
Paper.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3
1
Harkavy: Thinking about Basing
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
THINKING ABOUT BASING
Robert E. Harkavy
Recent U.S. experiences—1990–91 in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia, Kosovo,and then in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)—have highlighted the
complexities and uncertainties of basing access in the post–Cold War period.
They have involved questions of access to, and overhead transit rights for, a vari-
ety of nations: all over Europe, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tadzhikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti, and many others. They have also highlighted the crucial
importance of the future of American basing access at a time of shifting alli-
ances, friendships, and enmities amid wholesale changes in the structure of the
international system, and of the movement to the forefront of the issues of ter-
rorism, radical Islam, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a loom-
ing hegemonic challenge by China.
There are some initial points to be made regarding definitions. One may
speak variously of bases, facilities, host-nation support, installations, strategic
access, forward presence, global posture, and FMP (foreign military presence).
During the latter part of the Cold War, common usage dictated the use of “facili-
ties” rather than “bases,” because the user nation (primarily the United States)
had only limited discretion over the use of a “base.” The U.S. Defense Depart-
ment’s compilation of domestic and foreign bases is organized according to dis-
crete installations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute uses
the basic concept of “FMP” in a way roughly synonymous with others’ use of
“base.”1 The concept of “basing access” or “strategic access” is a broader con-
struction, subsuming overflight rights and perhaps access for intelligence opera-
tions. During the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of “power projection” came to be
seen as an overarching one.2
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More recently, “global posture” (also “footprint”) has become the dominant
definitional concept; more theoretically oriented academic studies, working in
historical contexts, have begun to focus on “global reach” or, earlier, “sub-global
reach.”3 Recent Defense Department publications—for instance, the September
2004 report to Congress on the global defense posture—have taken to defining
that posture according to five criteria: relationships (interaction with allies and
partners at all levels), activities (training, exercises, and operations), facilities
(where forces live, train, and operate, and where they preposition materiel), legal
arrangements (the framework of presence, including status-of-forces agree-
ments, both bilateral and multilateral), and global sourcing and surge (a
global-force management system for power projection).4 Thus, although the
main focus of this article will be on bases/facilities, “global posture” does have a
broader frame of reference.
BASING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the centuries-long history of the basing systems of the “great powers,” or
“long-cycle hegemons,” several major areas of generalization and trend stand
out, each of which is relevant to current problems. These are complex matters,
and we can merely summarize them here.
• The role of international system structure (bipolarity, multipolarity, etc.)
and the presence or absence of ideological roots of rivalry between
contending major powers
• The basis for basing access: conquest or colonization versus formal
alliances or alignments versus tangible quid pro quos—that is, security and
economic assistance, arms transfers, etc.
• The impact on basing of ever-evolving technological change—for ship
propulsion, from sail to oared galleys to sail to coal to oil to nuclear power
• The nexus of security and economic functions of basing and how that has
shifted over time
• Heartland versus rimland as a basic pattern of rival basing structures
through time.
The relationship of system structure and the ideological basis for conflict
over many centuries is a complicated story. The empire of the Mongols, who
were predominantly a land power, stretched across most of Eurasia but also ex-
ercised maritime and basing dominance in the Far East in the thirteenth century.
Subsequently, the Chinese Ming dynasty, a regional hegemon, had uncontested
access to bases throughout Southeast Asia and around the Indian Ocean. In the
Mediterranean, from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries first Venice and
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Genoa, then Venice (latterly Spain) and the Ottoman Empire were locked in re-
gional competition for maritime dominance and basing structures. Their re-
spective bases, especially those of Venice and Genoa, were often cheek by jowl,
constituting interpenetrating systems. (The Venice-Ottoman rivalry and that of
Spain and the Ottomans was somewhat more demarcated between east and west.)
Portugal and Spain had rival but formally demarcated basing structures, with
Portugal acquiring bases all around Africa and the Indian Ocean and in the Far
East and Brazil, Spain mostly in Latin America but also in the Philippines and
the western Mediterranean. Some scholars do not rate Portugal a great power
during the early modern era, as it was a maritime power only, standing on the
margins of a Europe then dominated by the Habsburg Empire. If so, we have
somewhat of a divorce between great-power status and the facts of semiglobal
basing structure. In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands was a commercial
and maritime hegemon, with the most elaborate basing structure of its day, but
it existed within a multipolar power structure in Europe, and its bases interpen-
etrated the systems of England and France, particularly in India.
The British Empire had maritime predominance and an unmatched global
basing system, also in the overall context of European multipolarity, wherein
other powers—France, Prussia/Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—were
major land powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and on up to
World War I.
During the Cold War, the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union saw a global competition for basing access, but an asymmetric one
with respect to maritime power, in which one side, the United States, was pre-
dominant throughout. Only since the early 1990s, however, has the United
States had complete maritime predominance and the only global basing pres-
ence, with no rival whatsoever. Generally speaking, basing structures have corre-
lated with the facts of relative national power, with the exception, perhaps, of
Portugal.
Over time, bases and access in general have resulted from conquest and colo-
nization, alliances, or quid pro quos such as security assistance, though these
have not been mutually exclusive. The Mongols’ few bases were acquired entirely
by conquest. Those of Ming China seem to have been a mix of “forced entry,”
also known as intimidation, and agreements with local potentates interested in
trade. The bases of the Venetian, Genoese, Ottoman, and Spanish fleets of oared
galleys in the Mediterranean were mostly the results of conquest, in some cases
of more consensual arrangements. Spain’s basing structure accrued entirely by
ruthless conquest and colonization. Portugal’s involved some military conquest,
but also a good deal of alliance building among more advanced (relative to those
of Spain’s domain) societies in India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Dutch
H A R K A V Y 1 5
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took over most of the Portuguese basing structure by conquest; the British built
their empire and its attendant basing structure almost entirely on the basis of
conquest “beyond the line,” in what now is called the Third World. But many
British bases in Europe were acquired, often ad hoc, on the basis of ever-shifting
alliances in a multipolar European system sans ideology.
In the early part of the Cold War, the United States availed itself of a large
number of bases via alliances with the United Kingdom and France, before the
possessions and bases of the latter gradually dwindled as a result of decoloni-
zation. After that, starting in the 1960s, the United States (and also the Soviet
Union) built global basing structures on the basis of alliances with ideologically
friendly client states, underpinned by protection and provision of security but
also by extensive security assistance, mostly in the form of arms transfers.
Throughout the past half millennium or more, needless to say, technological
change has been a major driver of basing requirements. Up to World War I and
somewhat beyond, that pattern pertained almost entirely to naval technology.
The Mongols and Ming Chinese built large sailing vessels that gave them
long-range power-projection capability. In the Mediterranean from the thir-
teenth to sixteenth centuries, the contending powers used oared galleys; their
limited ranges and extensive logistical requirements translated into the need by
the Venetians, Genoese, Ottomans, and Spaniards for elaborate basing networks
even in that relatively small theater.5 Portugal, on the basis of technological de-
velopments in shipbuilding, navigational equipment, and naval gunnery, was
able to move to the forefront of naval power and establish bases in a quasi-global
system centered on the Indian Ocean.6 But travel was slow and dependent on
prevailing winds and currents; warships going from Lisbon to Goa around the
Cape of Good Hope had to travel west almost to Brazil to pick up winds favor-
able for the trip around Africa. The Netherlands, France, and Britain improved
the capabilities of sailing ships over several centuries. In the nineteenth century
the advent of coal-fired steam propulsion resulted in faster and more direct
travel for naval ships, but also in a requirement for numerous coaling stations—
a development of which Britain was able to take particular advantage because of
its global empire. The appearance of oil-fired ships (also of fleet oilers and col-
liers) reduced these requirements; later, nuclear propulsion would reduce them
further.
But after World War I, developments in aviation produced entirely new re-
quirements for external air bases; as aircraft ranges were short, the number of
bases required for ferrying combat aircraft or troops and materiel was huge.
Japan in 1941, for instance, had numerous air bases on Taiwan and Hainan Is-
land; Italy had them in Libya and Somaliland.7 The submarine produced yet fur-
ther requirements (for example, Franco’s Spain gave German boats access to the
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Canary Islands for refueling). Beginning with the undersea communications
cables before 1914, after World War I with radio relay and intercept stations, a bas-
ing requirement arose, for technical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) purposes. After World War II, that became an important matter; the
United States constructed elaborate global networks of AUTOVON/AUTODIN
communications, DSP and other satellite downlinks, the DEW Line and
BMEWS, SOSUS, NUDETS, signals-intelligence ground installations, and much
more.* Oiler refueling (for transfer to operating forces at sea) and constant
ocean surveillance produced still other basing requirements. But, paradoxically,
oiler refueling and increasing aircraft ranges greatly reduced the need for elabo-
rate external networks of air bases.
There had once existed a close nexus between the security and economic
functions of overseas bases. The Ming Chinese Zheng Ho navy, which roamed
the Indian Ocean littoral and its ports, did so mostly with the purpose of ad-
vancing trade. Venetian and Genoese bases in the eastern Mediterranean–Black
Sea area likewise were colocated with a variety of economic enterprises, and
many of the Venetian and Genoese war galleys were actually armed merchant
vessels. Portuguese bases in East Africa, India, and elsewhere were also
entrepôts, hubs of commercial activity. A number of the British and Dutch bases
in Asia were established by semiprivate trading companies closely tied to and
protected by their nations’ fleets and armies. By the heyday of the British Em-
pire, however, this colocation of military bases and entrepôts had largely been
broken, and naval bases were obtained and operated more or less entirely for
military reasons.
During the Cold War, however, the critical issue of Persian Gulf oil became
inextricably linked to basing access. American bases along oil-tanker sea-lanes
to Asia and North America came to be viewed in the context of a possible Soviet
effort (from bases in Angola, Guinea, Somalia, South Yemen, etc.) to interdict
them in case of war. In the late 1980s, with the “reflagging” operation on behalf
of Kuwait, the United States established new points of access in the Persian Gulf.
Today, as is heavily reflected in Defense Department and Congressional Budget
Office publications, overseas bases are seen in connection with potential strug-
gles over oil resources, not only in and around the Persian Gulf but in
Azerbaijan, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc.8 Economics,
then, in the form of access to oil, has crept back into basing access and global
presence.
H A R K A V Y 1 7
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Reporting System.
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Over the past five hundred years, the basing networks of the contending great
powers have corresponded closely with the geopolitical imagery of “heartland”
and “rimland.” As noted by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Colin Gray, and others, the
successive maritime hegemons—Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and
the United States—all established a degree of blue-water sea control based on
superior main fleets and a ring of naval bases all around the Eurasian
supercontinent.9 Periodically, they were challenged by land powers attempting
to develop equivalent seapower: France under Louis XIV, Germany before
World War I, the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
As has been pointed out in connection with
“system leader lineage,” the successive maritime
hegemons typically inherited their predeces-
sors’ basing structures, with modifications.10
The Dutch took the Portuguese bases by force,
but Britain in its turn mostly acquired the
Dutch bases peacefully, as did the United States
when it took over the role of rimland naval
hegemon from Britain after World War II. Cer-
tain bases or strongpoints astride key “choke
points” or adjacent to strategically important
locales, and islands with strategic locations,
have risen to importance with noteworthy frequency over five hundred years:
Hormuz, Angola, Gibraltar, Aden, Trincomalee (in Sri Lanka), the Malabar and
Coromandel coasts of India, Malacca/Singapore, Mauritius, Mogadishu, Hong
Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Cyprus, Malta, and Crete appear again and again in the his-
tory of naval warfare and bases.
During the Cold War, the United States, sometimes relying upon the rem-
nants of the British Empire, established bases in Iceland, Norway, the United
Kingdom, the Azores, Morocco, Spain (at Rota), Italy, Greece/Crete, Turkey, Iran
(up to 1979), Ethiopia (up to 1977), the Seychelles, the Maldives, Pakistan, Diego
Garcia, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, Taiwan (up to 1972), Japan, and South
Korea—in a pattern perfectly reflective of a rimland configuration around the
periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Now, of course, analysts refer to a newer
geopolitical configuration focused on intersecting “arcs of crisis” from North
Africa to South Asia, and from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia, reflective of a
present emphasis on oil politics and on combating Islamist terror and nuclear
proliferation. At least in part the rimland basing structure has been retained, but
the newer geopolitics spotlights the importance of access to Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel (a narrow band of
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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semiarid land south of the Sahara Desert), all around the arcs of crisis. Also, of
course, in view of U.S. naval dominance and the absence of a maritime peer
competitor, there is an emphasis on littoral warfare and control, in lieu of
Mahanian sea control.
CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES, SCENARIOS, CONTINGENCIES:
THE CONTEXT OF U.S. GLOBAL PRESENCE
Recent Defense Department and other studies have focused on outright inter-
vention scenarios (Iraq, Iran, Korea, Taiwan, et al., plus numerous smaller situa-
tions involving various types of low-intensity conflict) as the core of the
problem of forward presence, and accordingly have emphasized the more ad hoc
forms of access. That is appropriate, but it may be worthwhile to present a more
complex framework, with historical examples and possible future scenarios.
Hence, the following analysis refers to both bases and other forms of access, with
a (not always clear-cut) distinction between nuclear deterrence and the various
levels of conventional power projection.
Nuclear Deterrence and Defense
During the Cold War, numerous overseas bases were dedicated to functions re-
lated to the U.S. nuclear deterrence posture vis-à-vis the USSR and, to a lesser
degree, the People’s Republic of China. But many bases served dual purposes
with regard to prospective nuclear and conventional power projection—for in-
stance, forward-based attack aircraft in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan,
South Korea; access for carriers in the Mediterranean and East Asia; aerial tanker
bases in places like Thule, Gander, and Keflavik; land-based signals intelligence
stations all around the Soviet periphery; U-2 and SR-71 surveillance aircraft
bases; and others.
But some overseas access had functions that were primarily if not solely nu-
clear. Early on there were Strategic Air Command B-47 “Reflex Force” bases in
Spain and Morocco; medium-range ballistic-missile bases in the United King-
dom, Italy, and Turkey, as well as on Okinawa and Taiwan (for the Mace and
Matador missiles); DSP downlinks in Australia and Germany; SOSUS terminals
in a variety of places near choke points and Soviet submarine transit routes and
“bastions”; ground-launched cruise-missile and Pershing II emplacements in
Europe (before the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty); BMEWS sites in the
United Kingdom and Greenland; nuclear detection facilities (seismic arrays) in
numerous countries including Norway and Turkey; signals-intelligence stations
collecting telemetry data (in Iran, among other places, and later in China); Omega
and LORAN navigation aids; TACAMO (related to communications with U.S.
submarines); bases for ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) at Rota and Holy
H A R K A V Y 1 9
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Loch and for attack boats (SSNs) at La Maddalena, Faslane, and Sasebo; and so-
lar flare stations, other communications facilities, and the DEW, PINETREE, and
North Warning System early warning radars in Canada and Greenland. Much of
this structure was dismantled as the USSR disappeared as a rival (SOSUS and
SSBN bases, for example), but some of it remains (such as signals-intelligence
and DSP downlink facilities).
Today the future of nuclear deterrence basing is somewhat indeterminate.
The SSBNs—“boomers”—are now all based in the continental United States, in
Georgia and Washington State. Nuclear-capable forward-based aircraft, such as
the F-111s in the United Kingdom, have been stood down. But some technical
facilities remain—again, for instance, the DSP downlinks. U.S. nuclear deter-
rence today has Russia in mind only in part; basing in the context of nuclear de-
terrence has mostly to do with missile defense vis-à-vis China, North Korea, and
Iran. In Europe, the BMEWS radars at Fylingdale Moor in the United Kingdom
and Thule, Greenland (under Danish sovereignty) are to be upgraded. There ap-
pears to be an agreement in the offing with Britain to base theater missiles at
Fylingdale as well. Farther east, Poland appears the most likely host (Romania
and Hungary have also been considered) for missiles that could defend most of
Europe from threats in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Pakistan may all soon
be capable of reaching the heart of Europe with nuclear-armed missiles). In the
Far East, Japan has still to decide whether to host U.S. missile defenses against
North Korea and China; Japan and South Korea may host related warning radars
(Alaska serves this purpose for the defense of the continental United States from
Chinese and North Korean missiles). Finally, the United States could deploy
shipborne theater antiballistic missiles in the waters around Japan and Korea, in
the Mediterranean and Arabian seas, and maybe in the Baltic; the ships that
carry them would (to some extent) need access to nearby ports.
Conventional Conflict
The heart of the problem of global posture is future U.S. access in a wide variety
of possible scenarios in a context of ambiguous threats, uncertain alliances, and
ill-defined international system structure.
Before World War II, a more or less isolationist America had little in the way
of overseas bases, mostly (as also, on a much larger scale, for Great Britain) in co-
lonial possessions or protectorates—the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, the
Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. The Lend-Lease Act of 1940 pro-
vided the United States a string of bases, on ninety-nine-year leases, reaching
from Newfoundland to British Guyana. During the war, many other bases—in
Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, Acapulco, the Galapagos Islands, Recife and
Fortaleza in Brazil—were provided by a number of countries.
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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After World War II, the elaborate alliance system afforded to the United States
bases in the colonial possessions of Britain, France, Portugal, and the Nether-
lands. The use of numerous allied bases all around the Eurasian rimland was a
virtual given. This made it easy for the United States to operate in conflicts large
and small.
In the Korean War, bases in Japan were about all that were needed. In the Viet-
nam War, the United States was availed of air and naval bases in Japan, Taiwan,
the Philippines, and Thailand. Before and during DESERT STORM, access was
available just about everywhere in Europe and the Middle East. For a variety of
contingencies large and small, the United States operated in a permissive environ-
ment for access because of numerous stable alliances and other client relation-
ships, all underpinned by security assistance. Things became tougher in 2003.
At present, and for the future, the security environment is much more ambig-
uous, as are alliance relationships themselves. In place of a set and more or less
stable twilight struggle against the Soviet Union and its allies, there is now a
multilayered and fluid threat environment featuring terrorism, WMD prolifera-
tion, nation building, and peacekeeping in a variety of places, as well as a loom-
ing hegemonic rivalry with China, maybe the European Union, and maybe
Russia (again), in combinations and sequences not easily foreseen.
In fact, even with the best analytical work, conflicts—and hence basing re-
quirements—are not always easily envisaged or predicted. Few people in the
summer of 2001 could have predicted the need within months for U.S. access in
Central Asian ex–Soviet socialist republics to enable large-scale military opera-
tions in Afghanistan. Earlier, presumably, few British analysts foresaw the need
for a large-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands under adverse weather condi-
tions, and a critical associated requirement for access to a (British-owned) air
base on Ascension Island. The critical role of Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores
for arms resupply to Israel in 1973 (which arguably averted resort by the latter to
nuclear weapons) had probably also been only dimly perceived by defense plan-
ners. Whatever the elaborateness of scenarios, then, surprises may be expected,
including some that overwhelm “capabilities-based analysis.”
That said, scenarios for the future can be broken down into two basic catego-
ries, generic and specific. Most current open-source Defense Department analy-
ses rely on the former, if only to organize the subject. The generic scenario types
now commonly utilized are traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.
“Traditional” refers to familiar force-on-force, large-scale engagements, such as
the two world wars, the Korean War, DESERT STORM, the Iran-Iraq War, and the
1967 and 1973 Middle Eastern wars. In the academic literature—for instance,
in the research emerging from the “Correlates of War” project—the relative
scale of such conflicts is gauged by the variables of magnitude (number of
H A R K A V Y 2 1
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combatants involved), severity (number of combat deaths), and duration.11 Ad-
ditionally, one can point to “moving fronts”—that is, an identifiable shifting de-
marcation of large-unit forces, analogous to a football line of scrimmage. Some
analysts speak of a spectrum running from all-out conventional war to various
forms of “limited” conventional war, Korea being an example of warfare charac-
terized by tacit geographical limits. Most traditional conflicts are interstate,
though the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s was an intrastate example.
“Irregular” conflicts refer to a range of conflict types roughly similar to the
spectrum of low-intensity warfare, a term in vogue in the 1980s and 1990s. It
comprises guerrilla and insurgency warfare, civil wars (ethnic wars over terri-
tory and ideological wars over control of governments), coups, terrorism, bor-
der friction, etc.12 Most of these wars, the latter example excepted, are of an
intrastate nature. Over time, the dominant frequency of Marxist insurgencies
gave way to “Reagan Doctrine” anticommunist insurgencies and then, in the
1990s, to a heyday of ethnic warfare.
“Catastrophic” conflicts comprise those in which large-scale casualties are
caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—nuclear, biological, chemi-
cal, and radiological warfare. Hypothetically, some forms of environmental war-
fare might also be envisaged under this heading. Catastrophic conflict can
involve interstate warfare or terrorism. In the former case, it could come in the
form of “bolts from the blue” (preemptive attacks) or could come through esca-
lation of a conventional war to the use of tactical, theater, or strategic WMDs.
“Disruptive” scenarios are perhaps more difficult to categorize than the oth-
ers. Presumably they could include such things as electromagnetic-pulse attacks
that disrupt communications or “cyber warfare,” with or without an identifiable
perpetrator. They might also involve major political changes in nations via elec-
tions or significant shifts in foreign-policy orientation that could heavily impact
on U.S. global presence.
Again, the above generic scenario types seem largely a recasting of the conflict
spectrum elaborated by various authors in the 1990s running from nuclear
to conventional to limited conventional, to high-, medium-, and low-intensity
conflict.13 The shift toward a multipolar system somewhat devoid of ideological
conflict, and the advent of new technological possibilities for conflict such as EMP
and cyberwar, have added new dimensions to a comprehensive scenario menu.
In the Cold War, U.S. government studies openly acknowledged expected,
possible, or actual scenarios, mostly related to the two “base cases,” war in Cen-
tral Europe and in the Persian Gulf, both expected to involve the USSR. War
started in one of these theaters was thought likely to spread to the other (“hori-
zontal escalation”). Korea was, in addition, long an additional “mini–base case.”
Specific scenarios, however, are politically sensitive in an ambiguous political
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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environment in which the identities of friends and foes are not always as clear as
in the (in this respect) halcyon Cold War years. Now the scenarios considered are
far more varied, with respect to both type and location. Political sensitivities put
some within the classified realm, and again, there is a high likelihood of the un-
foreseen, though most can be fitted into the aforementioned four-way typology.
Underlined in all of this is the global, diverse, almost open-ended nature of po-
tential problems and the uncertainty of access in the context of shifting, indeter-
minate, and contingent or ad hoc political relationships. We shall return to this.
Arms Resupply during Conflict. Any number of scenarios can be divined regard-
ing future basing problems in connection with arms resupply during conflict. In
numerous past situations, the United States and other major weapons suppliers
have had to choose, in conflicts involving allies or friendly states, policies from a
spectrum ranging from embargo (the U.S. embargo on Pakistan in 1965, which
drove the latter into a long-term alliance with China) to all-out arms resupply,
with a possible time lag in the latter case, as in 1973.14 In 1973, access to bases in
the Azores (territory of Portugal) and perhaps Spain (tanker refueling) was crit-
ical to the resupply effort on behalf of Israel, as was the movement of some ma-
teriel out of Germany. An “air corridor” through the Gibraltar Straits was also
vital. On the other side of the Cold War divide might be noted Soviet use of air
staging bases and overflight corridors for resupplying clients in Angola (1975),
Ethiopia (1977–78), and Vietnam (1979). In Angola and Ethiopia the Soviets
used north-south air corridors similar to what the United States now seeks in its
contingency planning.
As for the future, who can say? Scenarios have been bruited for possible arms
resupply operations involving Israel, Egypt, maybe Iraq, possibly Pakistan or In-
dia. A new round of fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia, or between Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan, could bring this matter into play. In the case of Israel and
Egypt, a new conventional conflict might prompt an American embargo on
both, perhaps coupled with asymmetric Russian or European Union (EU) re-
supply of Egypt; that could trigger a repeat of the near-nuclear scenario of 1973.
In another round, Portugal and Spain might not likely allow the United States
access for resupply of Israel, but longer-range transport aircraft render this a less
crucial matter than before.
Coercive Diplomacy, Air-Based Intelligence. Coercive diplomacy, known as
“gunboat diplomacy” in an earlier time, may also require access. Numerous
cases have been detailed in which this issue came into play during the Cold War,
many cases involving access to bases and overhead air space.15 Once, coercive di-
plomacy usually involved the movement of ships, like the actual “gunboats”
used by the United States to affect behavior in Central American states.16 In
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1970, American ships based in Souda Bay (Crete) and elsewhere coerced Syria
into halting its invasion of Jordan. In 1971, a carrier battle group in the Indian
Ocean signaled an American “tilt” toward Pakistan in its conflict with India, and
friendship toward China as well. More recently, the forward movement of
AWACS* aircraft has become more the norm, though movement of U.S. ships
through the Taiwan Straits in 1996 to signal support for Taiwan was closer to the
earlier model. The firing of Tomahawk missiles as “signals” (some might say fu-
tile gestures) in Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan may be cited, involving ships that
may have had access to regional ports. A related matter is the flying of intelli-
gence aircraft off the shores of rival nations such as China, in which case access
to bases in Okinawa would have been required.
During the Cold War, the United States flew U-2 missions from Bodo (Nor-
way), Wiesbaden (West Germany), Incirlik (Turkey), Peshawar (Pakistan), and
Atsugi (Japan), among other places, and electronic intelligence planes along the
Soviet Arctic coast from bases in Western Europe.17 The shooting down of Ko-
rean Airlines flight 007 may have resulted, accidentally, from such activities.
Electronic intelligence collection is now typically conducted by satellite, but the
need for basing electronic and photographic intelligence aircraft may remain.
Presence/Showing the Flag. “Presence,” or “showing the flag,” mostly through
port visits, is a longtime maritime tradition, an important aspect of the politics of
prestige and alignments. In the nineteenth century, for instance, all the major na-
val powers sent flotillas (one of them the American “Great White Fleet”) around
the globe to show the flag, display might, perhaps intimidate a bit. Such visits are
made to allied nations but also to neutral and even somewhat unfriendly ones.
As was recently the case with U.S. ship visits to Vietnam, “showing the flag”(or the
acceptance by hosts of such visits) can be a way of indicating new political rela-
tionships. The bombing of the USS Cole (DDG 67) took place in that context—in
Aden (Yemen), which had been not much earlier a major Soviet naval base.
Peacekeeping. A more recent phenomenon is the use of foreign facilities in order
to conduct peacekeeping or interposition operations nearby. Here one might
cite U.S. access to facilities in Egypt to support peacekeeping in the Sinai, and in
Hungary and Albania for operations in, respectively, Bosnia and Kosovo. West
African ports like Dakar, Senegal, have been used to support peacekeeping oper-
ations in nearby states, such as Liberia.
A few points stand out from the myriad of possible complex scenarios. Most re-
flect focuses on WMD, terrorism, hegemonic rivalry with China, and competi-
tion over scarce resources—particularly oil, but possibly also such minerals as
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iron ore and manganese—and the possible nexus between the latter two.18 The
possession, existing or possibly pending, of nuclear weapons by Iran, Israel, In-
dia, Pakistan, and North Korea, perhaps later Egypt, Syria, or Taiwan, among
others, is at the heart of numerous scenarios. Islamist terror raises the possibility
of conflict and, hence, access requirements in numerous areas spanning the
West, North and East Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Central
Asia, etc. Hegemonic China looms large in such scenarios. Most importantly,
maybe, the supply-demand equation for oil also looms large, what with enor-
mously increased demand by China, India (with a projected population of 1.6
billion), and other Asian countries. China is now getting oil in large quantities
from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Angola, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Yemen, Congo, Equato-
rial Guinea, and Indonesia.19 It is looking for additional sources in Chad, Can-
ada, and Peru, among other places.
THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL PRESENCE
The United States has been reshaping its global presence to deal with new
threats, emanating from sometimes new sources, in a very fluid and complex
global environment. It is positioning itself according to new geopolitical em-
phases (arcs of crisis, African oil fields, etc.) and also in line with its own “trans-
formation”—an emphasis on smaller, lighter, more mobile forces. There is a
clear shift away from the residual Cold War global presence, marked by heavy
forces stationed where they would be expected to fight—in Central Europe and
Korea. The upshot of the scenarios themselves, the comparative costs involved,
the necessity to retain military personnel and attend to their families’ needs, and
a desire to lower the intrusiveness of the U.S. presence and infringement on
other nations’ sense of sovereignty is that global presence is being seen in terms
of trade-offs. The traditional option is forward presence/basing; a new possibil-
ity is sea basing; both political and new technological realities, however, increas-
ingly allow for resort to basing military operations in the continental United
States (Conus) itself. The latter two broad options are, of course, linked.
As indicated in recent Defense Department publications, basing access has
come to be viewed along a spectrum embracing the “main operating base,” “for-
ward operating site,” and “cooperative security location.” Main operating bases
involve “permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure” and
“will be characterized by command and control structures, family support facil-
ities, and strengthened force protection measures.”20 Examples mentioned are
Ramstein Air Force Base (Germany), Kadena Air Base (Japan), and Camp
Humphreys (Korea). Others that might fit that category are the air bases at
Thumrait, Seeb, and Masirah in Oman, and Al Udeid in Qatar. Yet others might
be the naval base at Yokosuka, the complex of bases on Guam, the naval facilities
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on Diego Garcia, maybe the air and army bases in Kuwait, and perhaps the main
army bases in Germany at Baumholder, Wurzburg, Wiesbaden, Friedberg,
Schweinfurt, and Vilseck.
A forward operating site is defined as “an expandable warm [i.e., kept in
ready condition] facility maintained with a limited U.S. military support pres-
ence and possibly prepositioned equipment.”21 Further, they “will support rota-
tional rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and
regional training.” Examples cited include the Sembawang port facility in Singa-
pore (which may be approaching, de facto, the status of a main operating base)
and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. Other U.S. Air Force bases around the
world that, as measured by permanently stationed personnel, might qualify are
Keflavik in Iceland, Royal Air Force Stations Lakenheath and Mildenhall in the
United Kingdom, Spangdahlem in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Incirlik in Turkey,
and Utapao in Thailand. Naval Air Station Atsugi in Japan might qualify as well.
Of course, the newer facilities being expanded and utilized in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania fit this model, as do some in the smaller Persian Gulf countries. The
U.S. facility at Sigonella in Sicily (during the Cold War mostly a U.S. Navy P-3
antisubmarine patrol aircraft base), if expanded, would presumably also qualify
as a forward operating site.
Cooperative security locations are “facilities” with “little or no permanent
American presence.” Instead, they are maintained with “periodic service, con-
tractor, or host-nation support.” Cooperative security locations would provide
contingency access and serve as focal points for “security cooperation activi-
ties.”22 According to Defense Department documents, Dakar is one example;
there the U.S. Air Force “has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and final
contracting arrangements . . . which [made Dakar] a staging area for the 2003
peace support operation in Liberia.”23 According to a recent article in the Chris-
tian Science Monitor, which omits the acronyms and Pentagon jargon, coopera-
tive security arrangements of this sort are being set up in several African
countries: Chad, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Ni-
geria, and Algeria, among others.24
Obviously, the main thrust here is in the direction of a very limited number of
main operating bases, so as to lessen the U.S. overseas footprint, and an increase
in forward operating sites and cooperative security locations to accommodate
lighter and more mobile forces for a variety of contingencies.
The current, evolving trends are clear. The first is some degree of drawdown in
“old Europe,” mostly in Germany, in favor of forward sites in Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Poland, either with limited permanent personnel or forces rotated
from Germany or the United States.25 The second comprises the maintenance of
forward sites, cooperative locations, and prepositioned materiel in the Middle
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East—in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman (concur-
rent, however, with a reduction of deployments to Saudi Arabia). A third is the
maintenance of bases in relation to Afghanistan—and this apparently in the face
of mounting pressure from President Vladimir Putin of Russia, who claims the
United States promised to withdraw from Central Asia after the end of the crisis
there. Washington has kept its bases in Afghanistan at Bagram, Kandahar, and
Mazar-e Sharif, etc., and has solidified access to air bases in Kyrgyzstan (Marias)
and Uzbekistan (Khanabad).26 That in neighboring Kyrgyzstan has also drawn
notice due to its proximity to western China. Fourth, Diego Garcia remains
(with British permission) a critical U.S. base for prepositioning, refueling, and
crew rest for B-2 and B-1 missions. Finally, in East Asia, Australia continues to
host important American intelligence and surveillance facilities (Exmouth, Pine
Gap) as well as offering American planes and ships access. Singapore, as noted,
now hosts a major U.S. naval facility, and the Philippines now is resuming basing
access for the United States after a long hiatus, prodded by the necessities of co-
operation on antiterrorism.
THE BASIS OF BASING
As we have seen, and historically speaking, nations have acquired basing access
in one of three basic ways: by conquest or colonization, by providing security or
protection for the host via formal alliances or less formal arrangements that still
imply protection, or by tangible quid pro quos—security assistance, arms trans-
fers, subsidies, or what amount to “rents.”
In the current context for the United States, conquest is more or less irrele-
vant, precluded by emerging international norms or “laws”—though some crit-
ics of the Iraq invasion see enhanced basing access as having been a motive for it.
An extreme situation regarding access to oil, oil embargoes, or unacceptably
high oil prices could raise the question of conquest of bases to deal with it. Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger, indeed, warned of this possibility in the 1970s.
As for bases acquired through the provision of security, during the Cold War
a number of nations provided the United States access at least in part because it
provided assurance against Soviet or Chinese aggression. The term “extended
deterrence”was often used to describe such a relationship. It may still be applica-
ble in a number of cases—for example, Japan, South Korea, perhaps again the
Philippines, even Vietnam. Access in Georgia and some of the ex-Soviet states in
Central Asia might be included, in relation to a possibly resurgent and revision-
ist Russia. Around the Persian Gulf, states are being made secure by a U.S. pres-
ence against Iranian aggression and maybe reassured about the implications of a
possible Saudi Islamic revolution. In addition, a growing number of nations—
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again, the Philippines, and some in Africa—may see an American presence as
deterring terrorists.
All of this represents extrapolation from current problems and scenarios.
Perhaps absent here is the broader picture of a changing but indeterminate in-
ternational systems structure that may heavily impact future scenarios, formal
and informal alliances, and hence basing access. Cold War bipolarity based
largely on an ideological divide has now given way to a degree of unipolarity
heavily influencing the facts of basing dominance, admixed with an incipient
though asymmetric multipolarity, the poles of
which are the United States, the EU, Russia,
China, Japan, India, and perhaps a nascent
radical “Islamic world.” Save the remnants of
communism and the growing ideological-
religious aspects of Islamic radicalism, the
new system is largely devoid of an ideological
basis for enmity and friendship, a state of af-
fairs that allows, as was the case in the Europe
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
rapidly shifting alliances based on short-term
or medium-term expedience and balance-
of-power considerations. Russia’s recent oscillation between China (arms trans-
fers, coalescence vis-à-vis the United States), the EU (ganging up on the United
States), and the United States (common front against Islamic terrorism) may be
a harbinger of things to come as well as a reminder of the past.
What of the future? The West versus the rest? The United States aligned with
Japan, India, and maybe Russia against rising Chinese global hegemony, with the
EU as a “balancer” and Islam aligned with China?27 An all-Asia front to drive
U.S. power out of Asia? There are various possibilities, and again, the shifts may
be rapid and frequent. At another level, nuclear proliferation, juxtaposed to
big-power multipolarity, will be critical, and numerous new entrants to the “nu-
clear club” are likely. North Korea (maybe later a nuclear-armed united Korea),
Iran, maybe Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and Indone-
sia, are all technically qualified.
What will be the impact of all of this on basing and, specifically, on the Amer-
ican basing posture? In the past, multipolar systems devoid of long-term stable
alliances usually have obviated or limited large-scale basing systems; in such a
world today’s “friend” is tomorrow’s rival and someone else’s “friend.” Nuclear
proliferation seems to portend the decoupling of alliances because of the intimi-
dation factor—unless the protection/security factor drives cooperative missile
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defense systems. Will Japan, China, Russia, India, and the EU develop effective
ballistic-missile-defense systems? Will some of these powers provide security as-
sistance as quid pro quo for their own bases or to deny access to the United
States? On the whole, decoupling and a very constrained environment for U.S.
basing might be predicted—and hence further reliance on sea-basing or Conus-
basing schemes (see later)—but all of this is uncertain. The effective use of secu-
rity assistance might alter the equation.
Security Assistance
The third category, in the current context, relates primarily to the use of security
assistance as a quid pro quo for basing access. During the Cold War, some of the
largest recipients of American security assistance—Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
the Philippines—were providers of critically needed access for the United States.
There are several categories of security assistance: the Foreign Military Fi-
nancing Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program, and the Economic Support Fund.28 Some seventy-four countries re-
ceive foreign military financing, some 130 receive IMET money, and some
twenty-six accept money from the Economic Support Fund, which is also used
to support multilateral programs concerning regional democracy, regional
women’s’ issues, administration of justice funds, and other such initiatives.
Several points stand out regarding the current structure of U.S. security assis-
tance. The first point is the dominance of the numbers by Egypt and Israel. An-
other is the truly remarkable number of countries receiving U.S. funds from one
or more of these sources, more than two-thirds of some 190 sovereign nations in
the world. Many that now receive such assistance are former Soviet allies and
arms clients (or even former Soviet republics), many of which once provided
Moscow basing access and overflight rights; among them are Egypt, Yemen, Algeria,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ethiopia/
Eritrea, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mozam-
bique, Angola, Mongolia, India, and Cambodia.
Regarding the Foreign Military Financing Program, Egypt and Israel are the
largest recipients, primarily as a result of supporting the Camp David peace pro-
cess, though Egypt has provided the United States access in recent times. In
2003–2004, aside from Egypt and Israel, only Jordan, Oman, Morocco, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Georgia, Turkey, Colombia,
the Philippines, and Pakistan received over twenty million dollars, modest sums.
The low figures for Latin America correlate with low levels of conflict and strate-
gic threat and the near absence of American bases (Colombia, for instance, has
had significant support in relation to drug interdiction). The United States once
provided large amounts of security assistance, as much as five hundred million
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dollars annually, to a small number of key basing hosts: Portugal (the Azores),
Spain, Greece, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines. Now, aside from the billions re-
quired to support the Egypt-Israel Camp David accords, money is spread out to
a much larger number of recipients in smaller amounts (though some are still
quite large): Jordan near a half billion (in part for underwriting the “peace pro-
cess,” but perhaps also for American access in the Iraq war), and Afghanistan
$190 million.
Djibouti and the Philippines have the largest accounts in the Economic Sup-
port Fund, each around twenty-five million dollars, no doubt reflecting Ameri-
can military access. U.S.-Philippines collaboration on the war on terrorism is
germane here. The IMET goes to a number of states, but the amounts are small,
only a handful above a million dollars per year: the Philippines, Malaysia, Thai-
land, India, Senegal, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman,
Tunisia, Yemen, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazahkstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania. The
relation to basing access is clear in many of these cases.
Hence, it would appear that in many cases all over the world, relatively small
increases in absolute levels of assistance would represent large proportional
jumps. Such increases could judiciously be used in exchange for enhanced access.
What potentially is involved was illustrated in recent cooperative security and
training exercises in various African states. The focus is on counterterrorist
training, particularly in and around the Sahara Desert and the Sahel; “These are
vast lawless lands where terrorists linked to Al Qaeda are known to operate—
and where the region’s large Muslim populations sometimes offer support or
sympathy to extremists.”29 There are promising oil fields around and near the
Gulf of Guinea—in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Angola, Chad, Equatorial
Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe. Reportedly China has been scouring the
African continent to line up deals regarding a variety of nonfuel natural re-
sources. As we have noted in this connection, the United States has been devel-
oping north-south air corridors to support military operations. U.S. forces are
also training personnel in Chad, Botswana, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and Dji-
bouti; in the last-named now are some two thousand American troops poised to
launch antiterrorist operations in the Horn of Africa or the southern part of the
Arabian Peninsula. The amounts of IMET targeted for these countries range
from around one or two hundred thousand dollars per year on up to about a
million for Senegal.
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ACCESS PERMISSIVENESS AND SCENARIOS, PAST AND PRESENT
As previously discussed, basing access has become more ad hoc and situational
since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the weakening of the formal alliance
structure constructed by the United States during that protracted struggle. Dur-
ing the Cold War, the United States was able, almost always, to utilize its overseas
facilities and the airspace of friendly nations. For instance, air bases in Japan, the
Philippines, and Thailand were used to prosecute the war in Vietnam. U-2 air-
craft were flown over the USSR from bases in Turkey, Germany, the United King-
dom, Pakistan, and Japan. Germany was a jumping-off point for American
intervention in Lebanon in 1958. Various nations allowed access for satellite
downlinks in connection with nuclear early warning and satellite control: Ger-
many, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Seychelles, even Madagascar for a pe-
riod. The United Kingdom, Turkey, Italy, and Taiwan allowed forward basing of
land-based missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and China. There were few excep-
tions—denial of airspace by France and Spain for the raid on Libya in 1986 was
one example. Also, numerous nations tied in one way or another to the USSR al-
lowed Moscow access and denied it to Washington: Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia,
South Yemen, Iraq, Libya, India, and the whole contiguous Warsaw Pact bloc
from Eastern Europe to Mongolia.
The keys here, in the prior period, were systems structure (a bipolar struggle
with ideological cement on both sides), shared threats, protection of basing
hosts, and perhaps a lower level of the anti-Americanism that is now the hall-
mark of diplomacy.
After the end of the Cold War, permissiveness persisted at least for the 1990–
91 DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM operation. There the United States led an ef-
fective coalition that was underpinned by the collective security mandate of the
UN and that enjoyed strong support from Saudi Arabia, hence also from most of
the Middle East. Only Jordan seems to have denied the United States relevant ac-
cess, which was provided fully by the Saudis and other Gulf states, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, Kenya, Turkey, all of the other NATO allies, and even the newly
“independent” Eastern bloc countries.30 Some political problems arose, how-
ever, in India and Thailand, as a result of the granting of permission to stage U.S.
Air Force transport planes.
In the Afghanistan war, the United States also was provided access almost ev-
erywhere necessary. The ex-Soviet states in Central Asia, with the permission of
Moscow, gave the United States vital air bases and jumping-off points to the
north of Afghanistan. Britain provided Diego Garcia. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qa-
tar, and others allowed the United States to fly missions from their territory to
Afghanistan. Nations in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus granted overhead-
transit access. Perhaps the only problem (other than Iraq and Iran, for obvious
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reasons) was Pakistan, and even that nation, under pressure from the United
States (and fearing American encouragement of an invasion from India) al-
lowed overflights and some access for heliborne ground operations. Intimida-
tion was a factor in that case. But overall, sympathy in the wake of 9/11 and
perhaps fear of an aroused and dangerous United States made for a permissive
basing access environment. Enhanced security assistance and the promise of
more were important.
In the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, there was an overall less permissive
environment for U.S. access, for reasons of political disagreements with states in
“old Europe” and pressure from the “Arab street” in the Middle East. Access to
European bases and overhead airspace was mostly maintained (Switzerland, ir-
relevantly, denied the latter). But reluctance by Saudi Arabia prompted the mov-
ing of air command and control operations to Qatar (which, with Kuwait and
Oman, was solidly favorable to American access). Egypt quietly allowed over-
flights, refueling, Suez Canal transit, and use of a major military hospital. But
permission for the movement of the 4th Infantry Division across Turkish terri-
tory was denied; there were hints of covert pressure from France and Germany
in connection with Turkey’s prospective admission to the EU. During this pe-
riod, also, there were reports of Russian complaints about continuing U.S. access
to the Central Asian states.
For the future, access may be even more situational and ad hoc. The keys are
likely to be alliance and security assistance relationships, the overall global level
of support for American policies on antiterrorism and WMD proliferation, the
political specifics of given situations, and the balance between reliance on U.S.
provision of protection and security and the counterleverage of foes of the
United States or states pressured or intimidated by the latter. Europe’s growing
divorce from the United States, and perhaps its growing competition with the
United States over access to Middle Eastern oil, may be a growing factor. Paki-
stani and Iranian nuclear arsenals may increasingly be intimidating factors. The
Muslim “street,” in Africa and Southeast Asia as well as the core Middle East,
may be another. Japan’s fear of nuclear-armed North Korea, not to mention
China, may be a strong factor in the Far East. In general, and short of actual cri-
sis, U.S. access all over Africa, in the Persian Gulf area, and in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia seems to be growing and solidly assured, but in specific situations
things may be different.
It is difficult to predict the extent to which permissiveness of access may vary
by scenario type—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive. This question
involves a spectrum that can be measured as macro to micro—that is, a nuclear
or biological terrorist event to a peacekeeping operation—but also in techno-
logical terms, running from force-on-force military operations to, say, a cyber-
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attack out of nowhere. Again, degrees of access allowed may be scenario specific,
depending upon the identity of the foe (Islamic or not, raising the issue of reli-
gious identification), fear and intimidation (in both directions), influence af-
forded by oil politics or other types of leverage (EU admission, security
assistance, various quid pro quos), and the overall intensity of anti-Americanism
(perhaps with regional variations). Relatively small “disruptive” scenarios in-
volving peacekeeping, responses to coups, etc., would appear to be most permis-
sive in terms of access; likewise, catastrophic scenarios would probably result in
sympathy for U.S. operations, though perhaps counterbalanced by the fear and
intimidation factor. One may note here the extensive granting of access to Amer-
ican military forces engaged in the tsunami rescue operation in places like Thai-
land, but also the skittishness of the Indonesian government about U.S. military
activities on Sumatra.
It is worth pointing out that aside from broadly systemic factors and prevail-
ing moods, global or regional, the domestic politics in given nations may be a
determining factor, with respect either to electoral change or coups and revolu-
tions. There are any number of historical examples, even from the period of sta-
ble alliances during the Cold War. France, under Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s,
canceled U.S. access to air and naval bases (Villefranche in the latter case) and to
crucial petroleum pipelines running from France’s Atlantic coast to Germany.
Iran’s revolution in 1979 cut off important access to telemetry intercept facilities
in northern Iran (the Iraqi revolution in 1958 had ended Western access to air
bases there). In the latter part of the Cold War, American access to Greek bases
was curtailed when anti-American governments came to power. Later, the
United States had to withdraw from Spanish air bases, obtaining additional ac-
cess to Italian bases to offset the loss. The Turkish situation in 2003 has widely
been reported upon; it came in the wake of the accession to power of an Islamic
party. In the Philippines, post-Marcos politics expelled the United States from
major air and naval bases. On the other side of the coin, in recent years friendly
governments in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Australia have translated into
very permissive access. Shifting political winds could later cause problems in
these countries, and in Japan and South Korea as well.
Conus Basing and Sea Basing
Alternatives to contingent basing access, or perhaps supplements to it, are Co-
nus basing and sea basing. Their utility will depend greatly on the scenario, both
in terms of distance and location, and also the sheer scale of operations required.
Conus Basing. The option of relying more on basing within the continental
United States has been illustrated by, among other things, B-1 and B-2 bomber
missions in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM,
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mounted from Barksdale and Whiteman Air Force bases, the latter at least mak-
ing some use of Diego Garcia. Also, military transformation, translating into
lower force levels and logistical requirements for given operations, has resulted
in more optimism about being able to rely more, if not wholly, on Conus basing.
Operation from the United States might be particularly applicable to preemp-
tive strikes on WMD installations or terrorist facilities, as well as to interdiction
operations in a “traditional” conflict. This option might be furthered by techno-
logical developments—faster attack aircraft with longer ranges and more accu-
rate bombing systems, enhanced capabilities for conventional interdiction by
SSBNs, etc. Also, satellite capabilities and reduced requirements for overseas
downlinks might in the future allow reduced dependence on foreign bases for
intelligence and surveillance. Better and faster sealift and airlift would also help,
but obviously only within limits, for traditional and disruptive scenarios at least.
Sea Basing. Sea basing has captured increased attention. It is, indeed, one of the
four elements of Seapower 21, along with Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and ForceNet.31
This new emphasis is the result of worry that land bases may not so readily be
available for future power projection operations, for reasons we have enumer-
ated. So some analysts now foresee greater use of seaborne platforms for opera-
tions ashore, a trend already foreshadowed by several small crisis operations
(removal of American embassy personnel, small-scale interpositions), mostly in
Africa, and by some aspects of the Afghanistan conflict. The Congressional Bud-
get Office (CBO) observes,
But the third, Sea Basing, is considered by many in the Department of Defense to be
the most transformational of the three ideas. It envisions putting a substantial Ma-
rine Corps ground force on shore and sustaining it from ships at sea rather than
from a land base. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps could conduct amphibious as-
saults (including “forcible-entry” operations, like those conducted on Japanese-held
Pacific islands during World War II) without needing to seize the enemy territory to
build a base or to get permission from a nearby country to use an existing base. Sup-
porters argue that sea basing would therefore allow U.S. forces to operate overseas
more independently, flexibly, and quickly.32
The U.S. Navy’s present 293-ship fleet includes thirty-five amphibious
ships.33 The latter comprise five amphibious assault ships of the Tarawa (LHA 1)
and Wasp (LHD 1) classes, eleven Austin (LPD 4) amphibious transport docks,
and eight Whidbey Island (LSD 41) and four Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) dock land-
ing ships. In addition, there are now sixteen maritime prepositioning ships. The
first three types of ships “carry Marines, vehicles, and the landing craft that are
used to ferry troops and equipment to shore; some also carry helicopters and
fixed wing aircraft.”34 The L-type ships together provide lift transport capacity
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of 1.9 Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) amounting to twenty-seven thou-
sand troops and their equipment. According to the CBO, in the past these ships
were arranged into twelve amphibious ready groups, three ships apiece, which
operated independently from the fleet and carried a Marine expeditionary unit
of about 2,200 troops, a battalion equivalent. Now the Navy is reorganizing its
fleet to make three surface combatant ships and one submarine available to each
amphibious ready group, producing what is known as an expeditionary strike
group. Clearly, this reflects a shift away from blue-water sea dominance toward
littoral warfare, under a myriad of possible scenarios.
The maritime prepositioning ships carry equipment only, no troops; they are or-
ganized into three squadrons of five or six ships apiece, based at ports in the Medi-
terranean, the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), and the western Pacific (Guam). Each
squadron carries enough materiel to equip an MEB and sustain it for thirty days,
thus a lift capacity of three MEBs. So that is the current basis for sea basing.
In March 2003, the Navy proposed to Congress a fleet of 375 ships, including
thirty-seven amphibious ships and eighteen new MPSs capable of conducting
sea-basing operations. Over a thirty-year period up to 2035, this would involve
purchasing twelve LPD 17s (San Antonio class), ten amphibious ships of a new
class (LHA-R) similar to the present LHDs but carrying more aircraft, twelve
dock landing ships of a new class (LSD-X), and up to twenty-one new MPF(F)s,
far more capable than the current maritime prepositioning ships. Thus by 2035
the Navy would have fifty-seven combined amphibious warfare ships and mari-
time prepositioning ships, organized into twelve expeditionary strike groups
and three MPF(F) squadrons.
The CBO sums up the Navy and Marine Corps plans for sea basing as follows:
In the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s vision for sea basing, amphibious ships would con-
tinue to carry the “assault echelons”—the first wave of troops—in any expeditionary
operation. The MPF(F) ships would carry most of the materiel needed to sustain that
force in the first 20 days of operations. They would also hold all of the equipment for
“follow-on assault echelons”—successive waves of troops that would be transported
to the theater on aircraft or high-speed surface craft. With sea basing, no land base
would be necessary for the follow-on forces to assemble themselves and deploy—all
of that would occur on the ships comprising the sea base. Nor would there be a large
supply depot on land to offer a prime, stationary target for attacks by enemy ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, or aircraft. The MPF(F)s are the linchpin of the sea base;
without them, the Navy and Marine Corps would not be able to implement that new
approach to amphibious warfare or forcible-entry operations.35
There are several lower-cost options: first, buy fewer more-capable ships
within the historical spending level; second, buy more less-capable ships at the
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historical spending level; third, create a more survivable sea-basing force; and
fourth, deemphasize sea basing in favor of forward presence. These options in-
volve a blizzard of possible options with regard to types and mixes of ships,
trade-offs between men, equipment, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, defensive
systems and survivability based on ship construction, etc., each to be costed out.
Another layer of complexity is the question of connectors for the sea bases—
that is, how to get troops from the continental United States (or Europe or U.S.
bases in the Far East) to combat zones, get them ashore, and then sustain them.
One option mentioned by the CBO is to purchase fast sealift ships capable of ferry-
ing troops from Conus (or European or Asian bases) at high speeds. Another
would be to fly troops to an advanced base and then ferry them to the sea base
using short-range, higher-speed vessels. Ships of the latter type already exist, but
new, scaled-up designs would be required. Other needed connectors are
flow-on/flow-off ships to bring landing craft close to shore, large air-cushion
landing craft to get everything to the beach, a new heavy lift helicopter to replace
the CH-53, or a new aircraft with quad-tilt rotors.
The CBO report briefly discusses four arguments against sea basing, whether
on a modest or major scale.36 Those arguments are the possible inability of even
maximal sea-basing schemes to deal with large-scale military operations, such as
in Iraq in 1990–91 and 2003; the vulnerability of sea bases to attack from ballis-
tic and cruise missiles, maybe even greater than that of less concentrated land
bases; the seeming unlikelihood that the United States would attempt large-scale
amphibious operations when it has not done so since the Korean War; and the
expense of all the new ships and connectors needed. Though the third argument
may be specious—this is what sea basing is all about, the projected lesser avail-
ability of land bases in an ambiguously evolving global political climate—but
the other three are serious. For instance, the sea-basing force envisioned by the
CBO for 2035 could cost seventy to ninety billion dollars over that period. Such
numbers would dwarf the current non-Egypt/Israel security assistance budgets,
raising the prospect of trade-offs between them and sea basing.
The CBO and other recent studies of sea basing have focused almost entirely
on force structures and associated budgets, with little reference to conflict sce-
narios—the possible locations and sizes of conflicts, impact of alignments,
availability of land bases, etc. The CBO’s overseas basing study is also stingy with
reference to possible or most likely scenarios, aside from brief mention of Nige-
ria and Azerbaijan (potentially important future sources of oil) and of Uganda
and Djibouti (potential staging bases for conducting operations in Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula to counter instability and terrorism).37 Likewise missing
is any juxtaposition to or cross-referencing with the now-standard general
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breakdown of conflict scenarios. An agenda for further, broader analysis in-
volves such issues as these:
• The relationship of projected sea-basing capabilities to generic and more
specific scenarios
• Sea-basing capabilities in a variety of regions, littoral scenarios versus
inland scenarios, etc.
• The viability of force structure planning with a long (thirty-year) time
frame
• Jointness—the disconnect between CBO’s Navy/Marine sea-basing studies
and its Army-related study focused on Europe and Korea
• The relative costs of sea basing and of enhanced security assistance to
land-base hosts, to the extent the latter is politically feasible.
A sea-basing scheme that allows for lift of 1.5–2.5 Marine expeditionary bri-
gades, up to forty thousand Marines, might be suitable for littoral operations on
the scale of the Afghanistan war or, given overflight rights, somewhat inland. Sea
basing would easily be capable, as it has been in the past in Africa and elsewhere,
of dealing with extraction and peacekeeping operations on a small scale. With-
out supplementation from the Army, however, or maybe even with it, a sea base
might not be capable of operations on the scale of DESERT STORM or IRAQI
FREEDOM, transformation to smaller, more mobile, and more lethal forces
notwithstanding.
Further, the relevance of sea basing to “catastrophic” generic scenarios is am-
biguous, as is preemption of sources of such threats. The limitations of sea bas-
ing away from littorals needs further analysis. Could, for instance, a MEB with
submarines and aircraft attached be useful in Azerbaijan, Tibet, Chad, or
Uganda?38 Presumably such issues, and the nexus generally between sea-basing
force structures and specific and generic scenarios, are being studied on a classi-
fied basis. The political sensitivity is strongly implied in the almost antiseptic
CBO studies.
Another conspicuous absence in the two CBO studies (Navy and Army re-
lated) is jointness. Army forces are hardly mentioned in connection with sea
basing, nor are Air Force capabilities in relation to littoral warfare. In the CBO
study of the Army’s overseas bases, the Marines are largely missing and the Navy
figures only in connection with “locations with the fastest deployment by sea to
potential areas of conflict.” Hence, regarding the latter, Diego Garcia is seen as
the best launching pad for operations in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, East Af-
rica, etc., and Bulgaria and Romania for operations in the Mediterranean–Black
Sea area. Emphasis here is on the degree of forward deployment, use of
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cooperative security locations, rotation of units back and forth to the continen-
tal United States, etc. Missing is an analysis of how the lift capabilities laid out in
the sea-basing study could help both the Army and Marines deal with large-scale
traditional scenarios, or of the limits upon deployment of the troops of the two
services imposed by sea basing, even with extensive airlift.
CONNECTING THE DOTS
The future of U.S. force-projection capability is, of course, a maddeningly com-
plex subject. There are many unknowns—in contrast to the Cold War period,
with its known potential enemies, known and stable system structure and alli-
ances, and a limited set of likely scenarios. Now, the enemy or threat may be large
or small, a state or something else, and may or may not have weapons of mass de-
struction. The identities of allies or “friends” in myriad possible scenarios are
contingent, unclear. Hence, the confused set of possibilities for basing, ranging
from land basing on the territories of allies to sea basing or to greater reliance on
bases at home.
Much has been made of the (perhaps overdrawn or nebulous) distinction, in
this context, between threat-based and capabilities-based planning. Threats, of
course, are only partly predictable, but capabilities and resources have their lim-
its, so planning for capabilities to deal with all possible threats would be unreal-
istic even if all could be known. Also, at least in peacetime, capabilities can be
acquired only over long stretches of time; for instance, the Navy would not have
the amphibious and prepositioning ships envisioned by the Congressional Bud-
get Office, largely on the basis of current projections of threats, until 2030–35.
But over the next thirty years, just about anything could happen to alter threat
perceptions: terrorist WMD attacks on the homeland could occur; China could
overtake the United States as the world’s premier power; Japan could join China
in an all-Asia alliance. The European Union could become a hegemonic rival to
the United States. Russia might try to reconstitute the Soviet Union, or orient it-
self to the EU, China, or parts of the Islamic world. Israel or Pakistan could in
desperation use nuclear weapons, perhaps suffering nuclear responses from, re-
spectively, Iran or India. Ever-rising oil prices, propelled by massively rising de-
mand in China and India, could cause another worldwide depression, and with
it military competition over oil resources in the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea,
North Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, there is the looming danger,
now taken seriously by the Defense Department, of catastrophic climate
change.39 Then again, a far more benign set of events (which extrapolation from
the present would suggest are more likely) might occur.
A special case is the emerging and important issue of external basing in rela-
tion to ballistic missile defense, which involves both defense of the United States
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itself from nuclear attack, and theater defense of U.S. forces abroad and allies in
Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.
Regarding defense of Conus from missile attack (China, Russia, Iran, North
Korea are concerns), the main basing issues today have to do with the upgrading
of the BMEWS radars in the United Kingdom at Fylingdale Moor and at Thule,
Greenland, under Danish sovereignty. For many years enhanced access to those
sites was threatened by political forces in Europe unhappy in general with U.S.
ballistic missile defense schemes. But the external basing of missile defense
should be seen also in the context of the defense of allies. In that connection, I
have developed elsewhere the concept of “triangular” or “indirect” deterrence,
whereby nations targeted by a U.S. strategic or preemptive campaign that are
unable to respond against the American homeland or installations overseas may
instead threaten U.S. allies.40 The value of the deterrent depends somewhat on
U.S. concern for the well-being of allies.
The 1991 Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia (Iraq having no capac-
ity to attack the continental United States) constituted an early example. North
Korean missile tests over Japan imply such a threat to strike Japan in response to
American preemption against Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities. Iran and perhaps
Pakistan could do likewise; both will be acquiring missiles that can reach
throughout their respective regions—to Israel, to the Central Asian states, etc.
As nations acquire still longer range missiles, the threatened area will expand—
in the case of Iran, all over Europe. Hence the United States must think in terms
of comprehensive regional ballistic-missile-defense capabilities. But some po-
tentially threatened nations, such as Japan, may be wary of acquiring such de-
fenses as “provocative” (this is a widely held view among the Japanese left) and
may indeed decouple from the United States and withdraw access for U.S.
forces.41 States intimidated by Iran or Pakistan could also decline offers of mis-
sile defense.
Europe may be less likely to block installation of theater defense systems un-
der intimidation or for fear of provocation, but some similarities may exist. An
“old” European nation might now conceive of its “grand strategy” as one of
building a “counterweight” to the United States, taking advantage of U.S. sup-
port for Israel to ingratiate itself with the Islamic world so as to attain preferen-
tial access to oil and the greater use of euros to pay for it. That could lead such a
nation to decouple itself from American defense policy, including theater mis-
sile defenses intended to protect it from “triangular” retaliation.
Poland, in contrast, appears to be negotiating the possibility of basing U.S.
theater antimissile systems within its borders, missiles that could cover much of
Europe. Britain seems willing to allow the United States to upgrade the
Fylingdale Moor site and maybe install missiles. Of course, U.S. warships
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capable of antimissile defense could be stationed in the Mediterranean or Baltic
seas, or off Europe’s Atlantic coast.
American antiballistic missiles could conceivably be used to “shut down” nu-
clear exchanges in progress in the Greater Middle East. That could be done by
shipboard missiles, but the possibility of doing so with land-based missiles
somewhere in the region (Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus) cannot be
ruled out.
Out of all these complex and contingent sets of scenarios and possible policies in
connection with the future of the U.S. global defense posture, a number of gen-
eral points deserve emphasis. The first is that the diverse, uncertain, and global
nature of the emerging threat environment requires an elaborate global basing
and posture strategy. Threats include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
traditional warfare possibilities in Iran, Taiwan, and Korea, perhaps hegemonic
rivalry with China and, maybe, the European Union. But looming quietly be-
hind them may be a struggle for oil, gas, and nonfuel minerals, perhaps to be
linked to terrorism, WMD, and great-power hegemonic rivalry.
A second point, related to the above, is the uncertainty surrounding the fu-
ture of the international system, specifically whether the current U.S. unipolar
dominance and alliance structure will hold up. In terms of basing, the issue is a
continuing permissive environment for American basing access versus a far
more restrictive one marked by withering alliances, a systemic shift toward
multipolarity, “ganging up” on the United States, etc. Historically, multipolarity
has meant less stable alliances and hence less durable, more contingent, and ad
hoc basing access.
A third concerns the present and prospective state of the three historical
routes to basing access: conquest/colonization, alliances and provision of se-
curity umbrellas (extended deterrence), and the quid pro quo of security/
economic assistance. The first-named is mostly now ruled out by prevailing in-
ternational legal norms. Alliances and security provision may be in jeopardy as
sources of access, because of changing international system structure and intim-
idation related to WMD proliferation. Security and economic assistance, how-
ever, may be at present an underutilized instrument of acquisition and
maintenance of bases, and a less expensive one than sea basing.
Fourth, and while sea basing and Conus basing are serious alternatives to
land basing by virtue of technological changes in ships, aircraft, etc., there are se-
rious questions of cost and of feasibility in relation to important categories of
scenarios.
Finally, and while I am not privy to the gaming of future possible conflicts
within the Department of Defense, attention clearly needs to be paid to a
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complex plethora of scenarios, along the lines of type (traditional, disruptive,
catastrophic, irregular) and cross-referenced both to expected availability of
bases and to various possible levels of basing at sea.
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